Showing posts with label history. Show all posts
Showing posts with label history. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 31, 2010

What is History?

As I begin to read Paul Halliday's Habeas Corpus - From England to Empire, whose premise is that conventional knowledge of Habeas Corpus is based on an incorrect perspective on history, I can't help but admit that he's right, at least so far about the analysis of the historical record.

I have never liked the phrase "history is written by the victor," because the victor isn't writing history - he's writing his perspective on history, which is no more valid than that of the looser.  In the past, I had thought that merely reading two opposing interpretations of history was adequate to get a full perspective on a topic  ... but when you think about it, what if both sides got it wrong?  Or what if you never had an adversarial relationship to begin with, but over hundreds of years the original meaning eroded over time?

Back to the issue of Habeas Corpus, it wasn't in the Magna Carta in the 13th century, but definitely existed by the 17th century.  Halliday writes that:

Despite the force of this belief, connecting the thirteenth century to the seventeenth along a single story line has always proved difficult. So much awkward silence separates them that some authors have thrown up their hands [saying the writ's origin "is lost in obscurity"].  Others have filled the silence with inferred lineages sprinkled with words of praise, borrowing heavily from nineteenth century historians. . . who in turn accepted [another historian's claims in the] 1620s as gospel truth. . . . Accounts of habeas corpus written in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries thus serve as durable examples of what Herbert Butterfield long ago called "whig" history. As Butterfield remarked, "the whig historian can draw lines through certain events ... to modern liberty." In doing so, the historian "begins to forget that this line is merely a mental trick." A linear approach to the writ's past that starts in 1215 fit nicely with a high Victorian impulse to write histories drawn in bold story lines with clear points of origin and arrival. But for all the power of such narratives, they do not amount to a history.  (Halliday 16).  
This paragraph blew my mind.  Never before - even when getting a Masters degree in International Affairs [which is just a History degree with a cooler name], and taking all of those history courses had anyone laid out how it's all wrong.  We're not basing our opinions by looking at original sources, your average history book is looking at tertiary sources who cited tertiary sources, who try to construct a false narrative to make it simpler than it actually is.  Comparing two opposing perspectives of this kind of history does not lead to the truth, because both sides are equally wrong.  You can't find the truth by averaging two or more incorrect statements.

So, what is history?  I have always seen it as the study and search for the truth of the events that have happened in the past.  When available, as it was with Halliday in his study of Habeas Corpus, History is Primary Sources.  Then again, Halliday spent five years combing through thousands of medieval documents, something the average individual - or even scholar - just can't do.  So in a case like that, history is a collection of secondary sources like Halliday's book, which heavily cites primary sources.

But in the end, I'm still not happy putting that much trust in one man, because even unconscious agenda's can color one's research and writing.  In an ideal world, I would like to see these ancient documents scanned and made freely available online for anyone to read through, and come to their own conclusions, and maybe write their own book which also heavily cites primary sources.

Thursday, April 9, 2009

Looking exclusively at the foreign policy of American Presidents:

Bush (43) is to __________, as Obama is to ____________.

a) Reagan; Eisenhower
b) Nixon; Truman
c) Truman; Nixon
d) Eisenhower; Hoover

Show your work.
--

c) Truman; Nixon

Yes, this is meant to turn an eyebrow or two, but just hear me out. There are essentially two different world views: Realism/Pragmatism and Progressiveism/Liberalism. Realists essentially believe that a nation's power (economic, military, & soft) should be the main concern in foreign policy, whereas Progressives believe that ideals - human rights, freedom, democracy, et cetera - should be the main concern in foreign policy.

Too often, we get tied up in party politics, and are mislead into believing that if the Democratic President does something then it must liberal, and if a Republican president does something then it must be conservative. When we look exclusively at foreign policy, we can say with certainty that this is not the case. George W. Bush's foreign policy was often called "Neo-Conservative," but don't let the name fool you it as "Neo-Conservatism" is essentially classic Progressivism/Liberalism; it was just re-branded so that it would be more palatable for conservative voters. "Transforming the Middle East, and spreading American values, through regime change in Iraq" is textbook Liberalism (CSMonitor, 2003) which closely mirror's Truman's ideological views in the lead up to and beginning of the Cold War (for more on Truman and the beginning of the Cold War email me for a copy of my Master's thesis).

On the other hand, saying to Iran "If countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, they will find an extended hand from us," is a textbook example of pragmatism - the kind of diplomacy Nixon used when opening up relations with Communist China during the Cold War (State Department, 2009).

Which do you prefer? If a country we dislike has something we want, should we work with them or against them? Bear in mind the costs of war (IRWatch: Are Wars Good for the Economy?, On Deficits and Stimulus).

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

Are Wars Good for the Economy?

There is a myth that wars are good for economies, and as evidence people point to World War I and World War II. This is not the case. It is important when discussing the extreme budget deficits and borrowing during World Wars 1 & 2, that America was mainly borrowing from its own banking system. More importantly, America was neutral during much of both of these wars, and during that time Europe was purchasing weapons and borrowing money from us, and it was the eventual repayment of these loans enabled the post war booms in America following both wars. America was doing great after the World Wars, but Europe was not. England and France lost their empires, and Russia and Germany lost even more.

Some have said that the only way to get out of our current economic funk is by entering into a war, or using an equivalent amount of government spending. The fact is we've been at war for seven years. The problem is that we've borrowed all of the money to conduct those wars, and thus our economy worsens.

Looking back at the example of World War II, the United States is playing the role of the European countries, while China is playing the role of America - sitting back and lending as we get in way over our heads.

Speaking macro-economically, war and long term overspending is not good for the economy. It is good for the lenders, but not the debtors.

Saturday, April 12, 2008

An Addendum on NATO

I couldn't find a place to put this in my previous post (the Past and Future of NATO) on NATO that was going in my final thesis, but I found this interesting nonetheless. This is from Dr. Nile Gardiner of the Heritage foundation, and I have heard this slogan repeated on more than one occasion to berate NATO members who are not willing to get into the heavier fighting in Aghanistan.

"NATO is a war-fighting alliance, not a glorified peacekeeping group."
(The NATO Riga Summit: Time for Backbone in the Alliance)
Is it? Is it really? It started as a defensive organization, and since after the Cold War when it started actually intervening in conflicts, two of the three were definite peacekeeping missions. I really hate bumper sticker catch phrases because they rarely if ever have any basis in reality.

Sunday, April 6, 2008

The Past and Future of NATO

While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has little to do with international politics in East Asia, it would be amiss for a review of present day US-Russian relations not to mention NATO. Even aside from the aforementioned European missile defense, which NATO actually just approved (NATO Endorses European Missile Shield), Russia is frustrated by NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the United States is eager to gain more allies willing to commit troops to the war in Afghanistan. But why is Russia so frustrated by NATO's expansion, and why is the United States concerned with NATO membership when NATO is not the possible source for troops in Afghanistan?

In the late 1940s, NATO was created with the United States in Western Europe as a regional counterbalance to the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, it was a purely defensive alliance; throughout the Cold War it did not have a single military engagement. In fact it was not until three years after the fall of the Soviet Union, that NATO entered into its first armed conflict, in the final months of the conflict in Bosnia. In 1999, NATO was called upon again and quickly ended the war in Kosovo. In 2001, NATO agreed that the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States constituted an attack on a member nation, and in 2003 NATO took command of the war in Afghanistan. In addition, throughout the late 1990s, Eastern European countries were invited and began to become members of the alliance. Not coincidentally, tensions between NATO and the Russian Federation rose during this period as well.

But why does modern non-communist Russia so dislike NATO? A member of the Brookings Institution puts it this way: to Russia "NATO is a four letter word" (James Goldgeier, Power and Purpose p183). Russia feels this way because of a combination of factors: NATO was originally formed as opposing Russia, and has very recently become more militaristic, and is expanding into Russia's strategic back yard of Eastern Europe.

A true rethinking of the concepts behind NATO need to be considered. This is not to say that the United States should bow to Russia's concerns, but just recognize that the security interests of Russia and the United States are not mutually exclusive. Compromise on this issue could do a great deal to help the United States with its other issues of contention with Russia.

Sunday, January 27, 2008

What is a Cold War?

After the Soviet Union had fallen, the Russian economy was in shambles, whereas the United States was the world’s only remaining superpower. Many areas of goodwill had already begun to emerge, and many believed the Cold War was over. The United States had little to fear from the new Russian government, but was this also true of Russia? Though the Warsaw Pact was had been dissolved, NATO remained, and in fact would begin expanding through old Warsaw Pact members. In recent years, nuclear arms talks would end. The United States would abandon the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, and would not only begin building a ballistic missile shield in the United States, but in Eastern Europe as well. In response, the Russian Federation withdrew from the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. Many have asserted that this is the beginning of a new cold war. But what is a cold war? What actually makes tensions into a cold war, and is it possible to stop it?

Saturday, January 12, 2008

Encirclement of Russia via NATO?

This perspective is from Robert Alvarez and is in interesting contrast to the previous one I posted from Peter Brooks (here). At the time, Robert Alvarez was a senior policy adviser and U.S. Secretary of Energy for National Security.

The Russian under Putin has asserted in a more authoritarian manor, none the less he enjoys a great deal of popular support... At the same time the United States has been pushing the envelope in my opinion in terms of encirclement of Russia through NATO alliances, particularly in terms of seeking to have NATO troops in Ukraine and places like that. And given the long history of Russia and its extreme sensitivity about military encirclement, these are not looked upon kindly by Russia.

________________
Source:
Diane Rehm Show: July 11, 2006 (Listen to the entire show online: Real Media, Windows Media)

Wednesday, January 9, 2008

NYU Professor weighs in on increasing tensions between the US and Russia

I've come up with a new way of researching for my thesis, I've been listening to old radio programs that are on US - Russian foreign relations. It works surprisingly well because I can listen during work and after work, go back and transcribe the interesting parts (and even search for the commentors' other works). Here's one I found yesterday: Stephen Cohen, an NYU professor on Russian history, commenting on increasing tensions between the US and Russia. A quick search for his other works included "Failed crusade : America and the tragedy of post-Communist Russia" (Book, 2000), "Second Chance with Russia" (article, 2001), "The Struggle for Russia" (article, 2003), "The Media's New Cold War" (article, 2005), "The New American Cold War" (article, 2006), and "The Soviet Union, R.I.P?" (article, 2006).


You always have to ask how another country has seen us. We have a habit in the United States of always asking how we see things or how we should see things. But in such an important relationship as between the United States and Russia, it is important to understand, in my judgment, that there has grown in Moscow the view, it's very widespread and it's even among the people we used to call democrats, that Russia has been betrayed by the United States. Not once, not twice, not three times but repeatedly since the end of the Soviet Union. That American policy is essentially based on three things: broken promises, the military encirclement of Russia, by which they mean the movement of NATO forces and American forces around Russia, and a persistent view left over from the Soviet era in American policy that when push comes to shove that Russia has no legitimate interest apart from those of the United States. Russians now, many Russians, I'm talking about those in the policy elite not ordinary folk, see this and see it with bitterness in their hearts and in their minds because they expected something different from the United States. Now, the question for us should be, "is that a reasonable fact based interpretation of our behavior in Russia?" I believe that is substantially a reasonable perspective of the dynamics of American policy going back to the Clinton administration and continuing through the bush administration. So therefore this question if whether they've helped or not with terror has to be put in that context. … They did more than any other country in the world to help the United States fight the land war in particular in Afghanistan against the Taliban. We could go into all of the details which range from intelligence to the decision to allow the United States to use a Russian trained force inside Afghanistan. They also acquiesced to the stationing of American military bases in Central Asia, which Russia considers its Mexico, its backyard. The questions the Russians now ask themselves, instead of asking what more Russia did, is what they got in return. What did Russia get in return for that contribution during the first six months to a year of the war against terrorism? And there view is that they didn't get anything. In fact they were betrayed; NATO continued to move eastward. For example, the Americans have made clear, breaking an implied promise, that they are not leaving Central Asia. For example, the sudden arrival of American troops in Georgia also in the Caucus, in Russia's border. So the world is not only how Russia is seen from Washington, but how America is seen from Moscow. You've got to somehow put those two views together and that's the job of diplomacy.


...


If you were to ask me what factor most of all in Russia will influence the fate of democracy, and which factor has most influenced it negatively, since the democratic reforms began with Gorbachov, I would say it's this. When the Soviet Union broke up, all of the property of the Soviet state and that was virtually all the meaningful property in the land, billions and billions of dollars in assets, everything from oil and gas to tv stations, and railway lines, and buildings flew into the air and the struggle to catch it became the driving force, the quest for property, vast property, incredible property, became the driving force of Russian politics. And when most of that property was caught, by a very small group of people we call Oligarchs, but not only them, others who were in that oligarchical system, it was regarded as fundamentally illegitimate by the Russian people, in part because so many Russians at the same time fell into terrible poverty, where they remain today. It's those two circumstances, mass poverty and mass perception that wealth in Russia is illegitimate that has driven forward an anti-democratic politic. Just think about how Mr. Putin became president and why. Yeltsin, who had presided over these developments, fearful for his own security, wanted in power a man he was sure could protect him, and so Putin was chosen because who and what he was, put into power and maintained there. And it is interesting that Yeltsin has remained silent on all of this.


Cohen was wrong on this point, the next day Yeltsin and Gorbachov would speak out together against this move by Putin, read more about in this article from the Jamestown Foundation. Unfortunately the original source from the Moscow News has been removed.

___________
Source:
Diane Rehm Show: September 15th, 2004 (Listen Online: Real Media)

Tuesday, January 8, 2008

Tensions with Russia - A Retrospective (Thesis Introduction continued)

During the Cold War, international relations were easy for the lay person to understand. The United States was and much of the western world was united against a common enemy: the Soviet Union. This enemy was unquestionably a military threat, but it was not this merely this military threat that the United States challenged during the Cold War, it was the idea of Soviet communism. For years, the United States embarked on a strategy of containment of this significant threat. On the surface it seemed to be a Manichaean world, the United States and Russia competed in the build-up of nuclear arms, in space programs, and even competed for the favor of third world countries, sometimes with military consequences.

This world-view was shattered in the early 1970s when the United States began to negotiate and even agree upon nuclear weapon limitations with the Soviet Union. By 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed upon their first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT1) and an Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM). In 1975, Russians and Americans shook hands in orbit in the first international space mission, Apollo-Soyuz. The Conventional Forces in Europe treaty limited conventional military deployment throughout Europe in the late 1980s, and by the early 1990s, the Soviet Union dissolved and Russia gave up its communist ways. By definition, this was not a military, but a diplomatic victory for the United States. Despite Russia's identical nuclear arsenal, America learned to work with its former enemy on economic issues and further strategic arms reduction. In 1998, the United States even invited Russia to enter the G8.

Yet in recent years, tensions have begun to increase again with Russia. Why?

Sunday, January 6, 2008

Former Prime Minister of Russia on the Eastern Europe Missile Shield

Back in December 3rd, I heard an interesting interview on the Diane Rehm show on U.S. - Russian Relations. One of the panalists was Yegor Gaidar, a self described pro-American former Prime Minister of Russia. He made some very interesting points regarding the proposed missile defense system in Eastern Europe.


Diane Rehm: Dr. Gaidar, President Putin is also opposed to a US missile defense system in Europe, please talk about why.
Yegor Gaidar: Well that is extremely delicate, the problem. And I am afraid that not even the high ranking officials in both the [US] State Department and my own [Russian] Ministry of Foreign affairs do understand the technical details like speed of the rockets, possibly the material targeting, possibility of the defense of decision making process, and I cannot share this information with you I am afraid. But to tell you frankly, if I would be in the place of President Putin, taking in mind that I am one of the last persons who could be accused of anti-Americanism in Russia, I would be extremely worried about this program. Not because of its anti-missile capabilities, they are entirely unimportant for Russian security, but because I know very well the systems which were elaborated in my country with double targeting anti-missile and ground to ground. I know when they were elaborated, I don't know when they were tested, I don't know the technical characteristics.

Our military thinks that they know about the similar systems elaborated at approximately the same years in the United States, so they inevitably because of their profession they have to count, to regard this system as potentially ground to ground system with they flying time of four minutes to Moscow. When we installed the missiles with the eight minute flying time to Washington [during the Cuban Missile Crisis] the world was the closest to the destruction of the ?? (pronounced. mi-no-na). And that is not eight minute, it is four minute flying time.
Of course, once again for one single second, I myself do not regard them as offensive missiles targeted to Moscow. But if you would place yourself in the position of Chief of Russian general staff, can you, just because you believe that America does not have any offensive intentions against Russia, to ignore this danger, then you would be irresponsible and unprofessional.
While I am not convinced that the anti-missile capabilities are 'entirely unimportant,' this does bring up several points worth considering. How far is this issue alone deepening the divide between the US and Russia? If the control of this system was a joint control between the US and Russia, how far would it go to alleviate tensions? For that matter, how far would discontinuing the program go to alleviate tensions? Are we, in America confident that this missile shield is exclusively to protect against Iranian missiles (which last I checked could barely get to Israel, much less to Europe or America)? And perhaps most importantly, is this missile shield making the United States safer?

___________
Source:
Diane Rehm Show: December 3rd, 2007 (Listen Online: Real Media, Windows Media)

Wednesday, December 26, 2007

Thesis Statement - Getting Back from the Point of No Return

By any accord, the first decade of the twenty-first century has been a turbulent one in international relations. This is especially true for the United States, not because of, but rather despite of the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Initially after the terrorist attacks 2001 the world stood in solidarity with the United States and offered their support, but since this support has begun to dry (further explain and cite). The United States engaged itself in two wars, stressing the US military, some say to the breaking point (further explain and cite). During these two wars, many of the United States' closest allies from the Cold War, including NATO, England and Japan, have slowly distanced themselves from the United States' foreign policy. The US dollar has weakened against all major currencies, and its foreign trade deficit has spiraled out of control, and tensions have begun to rise with many of its old rivals including Russia and China.


With each of these in mind, US foreign policy finds itself at a point of
the beginning of the twenty-first century has seen a major decline in the international influence and power of the United States.
As of late, there has been a temptation to place blame for this loss, but this point is counter-productive. There will be dire consequences if the United States continues to loose its influence into the next decade, and placing blame will not improve this situation. But this danger masks a great opportunity. In this atmosphere, the world will be very sensitive to changes in American foreign policy. Thus small changes during this time period will have the opportunity to make their largest impact on the international scene because solving many of the problems will also also improve American relations with the other world governments.



There are many places where this opportunity could be used, but the much of this effort should be focused where it would do the most good. Bearing this in mind two things must be taken into account: where the United States could make the most improvement, and where the building of stronger international connections would not adversely effect America's relations with other older allies. The Russian Federation fits this profile perfectly. It is the only member of the G8 which the United States considers a military rival. In addition, unlike the tensions between China and Taiwan, there is no country that would directly find normalization between Russia and the United States threatening. Though there are many issues of contention between the United States and Russia, and each of these issues can be solved to the satisfaction and betterment of both the United States and Russia.