An end to the Eastern Europe Missile Shield

I've discussed the Eastern Europe Missile shield once or twice in the past, and I'm happy to see it go as a part of our continued relationship building with Russia.

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White House to Scrap Bush’s Approach to Missile Shield - NYTimes.com: "President Obama on Thursday announced a reconfigured system that won’t be based in Poland or the Czech Republic, and will be aimed at intercepting Iranian missiles."

It's Done ... Kinda

Well I still have to defend the thesis... but I'm done with the writing. Let me know if you would like a copy by emailing me or replying to one of my posts. For a small taste here's the abstract.

The Cold War ended with the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Things were fine for a time, but in recent years tensions have begun to emerge between these two nations. Policy makers in both Washington and Moscow seem to be reverting to their old habits of a Cold War mentality, and some have even said that we are witnessing the beginnings of a Second Cold War. But Cold War is not a natural state. In the over one-hundred and fifty year history of relations between the United States and Russia, only forty of those years made up the Cold War. The majority of these years were characterized by peace, and there were even times when the two called each other allies. Now must be another of those times.

The global threats of international terrorism, nuclear containment and proliferation, and plateauing energy supplies cannot be resolved by either the United States or Russia alone. Working for cross-purposes on these issues would lead to failure on both sides. However, due to the existing high tensions over American Anti-Ballistic Missile Diplomacy, NATO expansion into Eastern Europe, and Russia’s invasion of Georgia, fruitful negotiations on these issues would be next to impossible at the present time.

The solution must be a confidence building measure, but one as far from Eastern Europe and the Caucuses as possible; one excellent opportunity is in Japan. Near the end of World War II, the issue of Russian involvement in the war with Japan was one of the issues of contention which would lead to the Cold War. Because of America’s role in Japan during the Cold War, Japan and the Soviet Union would never reach a peace agreement officially ending World War II. Since the end of the Cold War, low motivation and a minor border dispute have kept the two from reaching an official peace agreement. America’s role in these negotiations will be to nudge the two towards peace, while at the same time signaling to Russia that the Cold War is officially over and that the United States is open to discussions on the true issues of contention.

The United States needs Russia’s help with its greatest challenges as it continues in the twenty-first century. The time to end the Second Cold War is now.

Inspiration

First, an apology: it's been a while since I've posted. I was very unhappy with my thesis... it felt like I had quite a few good points but they just looked too thrown together. So I trashed my original and have been writing it from scratch, just copying my old citations when necessary. And it's really paid off, I'm hours from completion and feeling really good about what I'm writing. You'll be seeing a lot of what I wrote, and my conclusions after weeks of deliberation very soon.

But in the meantime, I wanted to give my inspiration for continued blogging after my thesis has been completed. I stumbled upon a webpage "Technorati" which seems to index blogs and rate them by their interconnectivity: there are two other blogs that linked to IRWatch! One of the authors I know, but the other is completely new to me.

It's called The Third Site, and deals with news revolving around Eastern European missile defense and the beginnings of the "new cold war." It really feels good to know not only that people are reading what I have to say, but care enough about it to recommend it. Well I am going to return the favor, from what I've read so far The Third Site has done an excellent job of blogging about the most recent news. I'll have to let him/her know when I post regarding missile defense and Russia.

An Addendum on NATO

I couldn't find a place to put this in my previous post (the Past and Future of NATO) on NATO that was going in my final thesis, but I found this interesting nonetheless. This is from Dr. Nile Gardiner of the Heritage foundation, and I have heard this slogan repeated on more than one occasion to berate NATO members who are not willing to get into the heavier fighting in Aghanistan.

"NATO is a war-fighting alliance, not a glorified peacekeeping group."
(The NATO Riga Summit: Time for Backbone in the Alliance)

Is it? Is it really? It started as a defensive organization, and since after the Cold War when it started actually intervening in conflicts, two of the three were definite peacekeeping missions. I really hate bumper sticker catch phrases because they rarely if ever have any basis in reality.

The Past and Future of NATO

While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has little to do with international politics in East Asia, it would be amiss for a review of present day US-Russian relations not to mention NATO. Even aside from the aforementioned European missile defense, which NATO actually just approved (NATO Endorses European Missile Shield), Russia is frustrated by NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the United States is eager to gain more allies willing to commit troops to the war in Afghanistan. But why is Russia so frustrated by NATO's expansion, and why is the United States concerned with NATO membership when NATO is not the possible source for troops in Afghanistan?

In the late 1940s, NATO was created with the United States in Western Europe as a regional counterbalance to the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, it was a purely defensive alliance; throughout the Cold War it did not have a single military engagement. In fact it was not until three years after the fall of the Soviet Union, that NATO entered into its first armed conflict, in the final months of the conflict in Bosnia. In 1999, NATO was called upon again and quickly ended the war in Kosovo. In 2001, NATO agreed that the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States constituted an attack on a member nation, and in 2003 NATO took command of the war in Afghanistan. In addition, throughout the late 1990s, Eastern European countries were invited and began to become members of the alliance. Not coincidentally, tensions between NATO and the Russian Federation rose during this period as well.

But why does modern non-communist Russia so dislike NATO? A member of the Brookings Institution puts it this way: to Russia "NATO is a four letter word" (James Goldgeier, Power and Purpose p183). Russia feels this way because of a combination of factors: NATO was originally formed as opposing Russia, and has very recently become more militaristic, and is expanding into Russia's strategic back yard of Eastern Europe.

A true rethinking of the concepts behind NATO need to be considered. This is not to say that the United States should bow to Russia's concerns, but just recognize that the security interests of Russia and the United States are not mutually exclusive. Compromise on this issue could do a great deal to help the United States with its other issues of contention with Russia.

A Look at Eastern European Missile Defense

We all know that the current Russian administration doesn't like proposed missile shield in Eastern Europe. In a previous post (Former Prime Minister of Russia on the Eastern European Missile Shield), we've established that even pro-western Russian moderates such as Yegor Gaidar are "extremely worried about this [ABM] program". But what is the government's official stance on this program? In May of 2007, two proponents of this policy were called before Congress and asked to explain if the United States and Europe need a European missile defense system. Together they presented the following argument:

The world’s most threatening and unstable regimes can develop and deploy lethal nuclear arsenals and the ballistic missiles to deliver them to Europe and even the United States ... The Intelligence Community estimates that Iran could develop long-range missiles capable of reaching all of Europe and the United States by 2015 if it chooses to do so ... The missile defense system that we are proposing to place in Europe—in cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic—would provide an extra layer of protection against possible missile attacks not only to the United States, but also to NATO allies and other European friends ... We cannot have U.S. security decoupled from that of our NATO allies. We cannot take a unilateral or isolationist approach to security.

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The 10 interceptors we hope to field in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic would have little or no capability against Russia’s large strategic offensive force, which could overwhelm the U.S. system’s limited number of interceptors regardless of their location. In theoretical one-on-one engagements, U.S. interceptors located in Europe would have little or no capability to intercept Russian ICBMs launched at the United States as the U.S. interceptors are too slow to catch Russian ballistic missiles.

There is no reason to believe that traditional nuclear deterrence would not work both ways in relations between Europe and Iran. The real problem is that Europe is not sufficiently motivated to take military action against Iran, especially after the 2007 United States National Intelligence Estimate which stated with high confidence that Iran was not pursuing nuclear weapons.

In addition, these plans made unilaterally with Poland and the Czech Republic because NATO was not willing to collectively sign onto the process. This unilateral action left the United States holding the bill for the cost of the system. But though the fiscal cost is significant, the diplomatic cost pales in comparison. It needlessly served to worsen US relations with Russian and led to Russia suspending its participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty (-BBC News).


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Full transcript of the hearing:
Do the United States and Europe need a missile defense system? : joint hearing before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress, first session, May 3, 2007.

What is a Cold War?

After the Soviet Union had fallen, the Russian economy was in shambles, whereas the United States was the world’s only remaining superpower. Many areas of goodwill had already begun to emerge, and many believed the Cold War was over. The United States had little to fear from the new Russian government, but was this also true of Russia? Though the Warsaw Pact was had been dissolved, NATO remained, and in fact would begin expanding through old Warsaw Pact members. In recent years, nuclear arms talks would end. The United States would abandon the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, and would not only begin building a ballistic missile shield in the United States, but in Eastern Europe as well. In response, the Russian Federation withdrew from the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty. Many have asserted that this is the beginning of a new cold war. But what is a cold war? What actually makes tensions into a cold war, and is it possible to stop it?

"Japan plans Tokyo missile shield"

Missile Shields aren't just for Eastern Europe and Alaska anymore. According to the BBC:

The Japanese military carried out their [Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)] assessment in the capital overnight.

According to a military spokesman, the two sites surveyed were Shinjuku Park, a business hub in central Tokyo, and a site in Ichigaya, not far from the Imperial Palace and key government offices.

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PAC-3 missile defence systems have already been installed at two bases in Japan, with authorities planning an expansion to a total of 11 sites by 2011.

The Japanese government is also co-operating with the US on ship-based missile defence systems.

In December 2007, a Japanese warship successfully shot down a mock ballistic missile off Hawaii, in the first test of a system that will ultimately be installed on four destroyers.

Interesting. While Japan has more of a definable threat from North Korea than Eastern Europe from Iran, this leads me to bigger questions. Is the US actively proliferating ABM technology? Certainly seems that way.

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Source
BBC News - Asia Pacific, Japan plans Tokyo missile shield

Encirclement of Russia via NATO?

This perspective is from Robert Alvarez and is in interesting contrast to the previous one I posted from Peter Brooks (here). At the time, Robert Alvarez was a senior policy adviser and U.S. Secretary of Energy for National Security.

The Russian under Putin has asserted in a more authoritarian manor, none the less he enjoys a great deal of popular support... At the same time the United States has been pushing the envelope in my opinion in terms of encirclement of Russia through NATO alliances, particularly in terms of seeking to have NATO troops in Ukraine and places like that. And given the long history of Russia and its extreme sensitivity about military encirclement, these are not looked upon kindly by Russia.

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Source:
Diane Rehm Show: July 11, 2006 (Listen to the entire show online: Real Media, Windows Media)

Russia and Oil from a former senior DoD official

This is another interesting perspective from an older Diane Rehm show, this time from Peter Brooks, the former deputy assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs in the Bush Administration.

They [the Russians] are using energy today as Russia's Cold War Red Army, the source of mother Russia's strength.

While I agree that the Russians are in fact using oil as a significant bargaining tool, I think the tone and vocabulary he uses is as interesting as the point he was making.

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Source:
Diane Rehm Show: July 11, 2006 (Listen to the entire show online: Real Media, Windows Media)

Russia, Chechnya, Iran and the US "War on Terror"

This perspective on Russia's views of Chechnya, Iran and the US "War on Terror" from Andrew Kuchins, the director of the Russia-Eurasia program. This is from an interview from the Diane Rehm Show, this one from July 2006. He gives several interesting perspectives on some of the key issues of contention between the US and Russia.

Diane Rehm: Are there parallels between the US war on terrorism and Russia's differences with Chechnya?
Andrew Kuchins: Well it gets to the way the US and the Russians perceive the war on terrorism, and for the Russians the war on terrorism is primarily Chechnya and the northern Caucasuses, and to a secondary degree would be Central Asia and then Afghanistan, which the Russians care a lot about and that's why the Russians supported us five years ago in taking out the Taliban in Afghanistan. When we get to our military effort in Iraq which we all know the Russians opposed, and when get to Russian concerns about a military operation in Iran which they also oppose, it gets to the differences in how they perceive the war on terror. Especially on Iran, this is interesting I think, for the Russians Iran is viewed more of as a strategic partner, a geopolitical partner. The Iranians have never, to my knowledge, supported terrorist groups or terrorist activities on the territory of the Russian Federation. In fact, the Iranians worked together with the Russians in diffusing the civil war in Tajikistan back in the 1990s, they worked together of course with the Russians and even us to supply the Northern Alliance to take out the Taliban five years ago. So the Russians I think are quite wary about doing something which would associate themselves with punitive actions against Iran.

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Source:
Diane Rehm Show: July 11, 2006 (Listen to the entire show online: Real Media, Windows Media)

NYU Professor weighs in on increasing tensions between the US and Russia

I've come up with a new way of researching for my thesis, I've been listening to old radio programs that are on US - Russian foreign relations. It works surprisingly well because I can listen during work and after work, go back and transcribe the interesting parts (and even search for the commentors' other works). Here's one I found yesterday: Stephen Cohen, an NYU professor on Russian history, commenting on increasing tensions between the US and Russia. A quick search for his other works included "Failed crusade : America and the tragedy of post-Communist Russia" (Book, 2000), "Second Chance with Russia" (article, 2001), "The Struggle for Russia" (article, 2003), "The Media's New Cold War" (article, 2005), "The New American Cold War" (article, 2006), and "The Soviet Union, R.I.P?" (article, 2006).

You always have to ask how another country has seen us. We have a habit in the United States of always asking how we see things or how we should see things. But in such an important relationship as between the United States and Russia, it is important to understand, in my judgment, that there has grown in Moscow the view, it's very widespread and it's even among the people we used to call democrats, that Russia has been betrayed by the United States. Not once, not twice, not three times but repeatedly since the end of the Soviet Union. That American policy is essentially based on three things: broken promises, the military encirclement of Russia, by which they mean the movement of NATO forces and American forces around Russia, and a persistent view left over from the Soviet era in American policy that when push comes to shove that Russia has no legitimate interest apart from those of the United States. Russians now, many Russians, I'm talking about those in the policy elite not ordinary folk, see this and see it with bitterness in their hearts and in their minds because they expected something different from the United States. Now, the question for us should be, "is that a reasonable fact based interpretation of our behavior in Russia?" I believe that is substantially a reasonable perspective of the dynamics of American policy going back to the Clinton administration and continuing through the bush administration. So therefore this question if whether they've helped or not with terror has to be put in that context. … They did more than any other country in the world to help the United States fight the land war in particular in Afghanistan against the Taliban. We could go into all of the details which range from intelligence to the decision to allow the United States to use a Russian trained force inside Afghanistan. They also acquiesced to the stationing of American military bases in Central Asia, which Russia considers its Mexico, its backyard. The questions the Russians now ask themselves, instead of asking what more Russia did, is what they got in return. What did Russia get in return for that contribution during the first six months to a year of the war against terrorism? And there view is that they didn't get anything. In fact they were betrayed; NATO continued to move eastward. For example, the Americans have made clear, breaking an implied promise, that they are not leaving Central Asia. For example, the sudden arrival of American troops in Georgia also in the Caucus, in Russia's border. So the world is not only how Russia is seen from Washington, but how America is seen from Moscow. You've got to somehow put those two views together and that's the job of diplomacy.


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If you were to ask me what factor most of all in Russia will influence the fate of democracy, and which factor has most influenced it negatively, since the democratic reforms began with Gorbachov, I would say it's this. When the Soviet Union broke up, all of the property of the Soviet state and that was virtually all the meaningful property in the land, billions and billions of dollars in assets, everything from oil and gas to tv stations, and railway lines, and buildings flew into the air and the struggle to catch it became the driving force, the quest for property, vast property, incredible property, became the driving force of Russian politics. And when most of that property was caught, by a very small group of people we call Oligarchs, but not only them, others who were in that oligarchical system, it was regarded as fundamentally illegitimate by the Russian people, in part because so many Russians at the same time fell into terrible poverty, where they remain today. It's those two circumstances, mass poverty and mass perception that wealth in Russia is illegitimate that has driven forward an anti-democratic politic. Just think about how Mr. Putin became president and why. Yeltsin, who had presided over these developments, fearful for his own security, wanted in power a man he was sure could protect him, and so Putin was chosen because who and what he was, put into power and maintained there. And it is interesting that Yeltsin has remained silent on all of this.

Cohen was wrong on this point, the next day Yeltsin and Gorbachov would speak out together against this move by Putin, read more about in this article from the Jamestown Foundation. Unfortunately the original source from the Moscow News has been removed.

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Source:
Diane Rehm Show: September 15th, 2004 (Listen Online: Real Media)

Tensions with Russia - A Retrospective (Thesis Introduction continued)

During the Cold War, international relations were easy for the lay person to understand. The United States was and much of the western world was united against a common enemy: the Soviet Union. This enemy was unquestionably a military threat, but it was not this merely this military threat that the United States challenged during the Cold War, it was the idea of Soviet communism. For years, the United States embarked on a strategy of containment of this significant threat. On the surface it seemed to be a Manichaean world, the United States and Russia competed in the build-up of nuclear arms, in space programs, and even competed for the favor of third world countries, sometimes with military consequences.

This world-view was shattered in the early 1970s when the United States began to negotiate and even agree upon nuclear weapon limitations with the Soviet Union. By 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed upon their first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT1) and an Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty (ABM). In 1975, Russians and Americans shook hands in orbit in the first international space mission, Apollo-Soyuz. The Conventional Forces in Europe treaty limited conventional military deployment throughout Europe in the late 1980s, and by the early 1990s, the Soviet Union dissolved and Russia gave up its communist ways. By definition, this was not a military, but a diplomatic victory for the United States. Despite Russia's identical nuclear arsenal, America learned to work with its former enemy on economic issues and further strategic arms reduction. In 1998, the United States even invited Russia to enter the G8.

Yet in recent years, tensions have begun to increase again with Russia. Why?

Former Prime Minister of Russia on the Eastern Europe Missile Shield

Back in December 3rd, I heard an interesting interview on the Diane Rehm show on U.S. - Russian Relations. One of the panalists was Yegor Gaidar, a self described pro-American former Prime Minister of Russia. He made some very interesting points regarding the proposed missile defense system in Eastern Europe.

Diane Rehm: Dr. Gaidar, President Putin is also opposed to a US missile defense system in Europe, please talk about why.

Yegor Gaidar: Well that is extremely delicate, the problem. And I am afraid that not even the high ranking officials in both the [US] State Department and my own [Russian] Ministry of Foreign affairs do understand the technical details like speed of the rockets, possibly the material targeting, possibility of the defense of decision making process, and I cannot share this information with you I am afraid. But to tell you frankly, if I would be in the place of President Putin, taking in mind that I am one of the last persons who could be accused of anti-Americanism in Russia, I would be extremely worried about this program. Not because of its anti-missile capabilities, they are entirely unimportant for Russian security, but because I know very well the systems which were elaborated in my country with double targeting anti-missile and ground to ground. I know when they were elaborated, I don't know when they were tested, I don't know the technical characteristics.

Our military thinks that they know about the similar systems elaborated at approximately the same years in the United States, so they inevitably because of their profession they have to count, to regard this system as potentially ground to ground system with they flying time of four minutes to Moscow. When we installed the missiles with the eight minute flying time to Washington [during the Cuban Missile Crisis] the world was the closest to the destruction of the ?? (pronounced. mi-no-na). And that is not eight minute, it is four minute flying time.

Of course, once again for one single second, I myself do not regard them as offensive missiles targeted to Moscow. But if you would place yourself in the position of Chief of Russian general staff, can you, just because you believe that America does not have any offensive intentions against Russia, to ignore this danger, then you would be irresponsible and unprofessional.

While I am not convinced that the anti-missile capabilities are 'entirely unimportant,' this does bring up several points worth considering. How far is this issue alone deepening the divide between the US and Russia? If the control of this system was a joint control between the US and Russia, how far would it go to alleviate tensions? For that matter, how far would discontinuing the program go to alleviate tensions? Are we, in America confident that this missile shield is exclusively to protect against Iranian missiles (which last I checked could barely get to Israel, much less to Europe or America)? And perhaps most importantly, is this missile shield making the United States safer?

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Source:
Diane Rehm Show: December 3rd, 2007 (Listen Online: Real Media, Windows Media)

Thesis Statement - Getting Back from the Point of No Return

By any accord, the first decade of the twenty-first century has been a turbulent one in international relations. This is especially true for the United States, not because of, but rather despite of the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Initially after the terrorist attacks 2001 the world stood in solidarity with the United States and offered their support, but since this support has begun to dry (further explain and cite). The United States engaged itself in two wars, stressing the US military, some say to the breaking point (further explain and cite). During these two wars, many of the United States' closest allies from the Cold War, including NATO, England and Japan, have slowly distanced themselves from the United States' foreign policy. The US dollar has weakened against all major currencies, and its foreign trade deficit has spiraled out of control, and tensions have begun to rise with many of its old rivals including Russia and China.

With each of these in mind, US foreign policy finds itself at a point of
the beginning of the twenty-first century has seen a major decline in the international influence and power of the United States. As of late, there has been a temptation to place blame for this loss, but this point is counter-productive. There will be dire consequences if the United States continues to loose its influence into the next decade, and placing blame will not improve this situation. But this danger masks a great opportunity. In this atmosphere, the world will be very sensitive to changes in American foreign policy. Thus small changes during this time period will have the opportunity to make their largest impact on the international scene because solving many of the problems will also also improve American relations with the other world governments.

There are many places where this opportunity could be used, but the much of this effort should be focused where it would do the most good. Bearing this in mind two things must be taken into account: where the United States could make the most improvement, and where the building of stronger international connections would not adversely effect America's relations with other older allies. The Russian Federation fits this profile perfectly. It is the only member of the G8 which the United States considers a military rival. In addition, unlike the tensions between China and Taiwan, there is no country that would directly find normalization between Russia and the United States threatening. Though there are many issues of contention between the United States and Russia, and each of these issues can be solved to the satisfaction and betterment of both the United States and Russia.